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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Plaintiff-Appellant Aurora Credit Sendees, Inc. ("Aurora") appeals the trial 
court's November 10, 2004 entry of final judgment against it, and in favor of Defendants-
Appellees Liberty West Development, Inc. ("Liberty West"), XM International ("XM") 
and Dennis W. Gay ("Mr. Gay") (collectively, "Defendants"). The Utah Court of 
Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REWEW 
Defendants present the following statement of the issues and standards of review 
to clarify and correct certain deficiencies in the corresponding sections of Aurora's brief. 
1. Did the trial court properly reject Aurora's claim that it was not required to 
respond to Defendants' discovery because there was a minor typographical error in the 
address to which they were mailed, where Aurora admitted it received the requests about 
a week after they were mailed? 
a. Standard of Review. Aurora incorrectly states the standard of 
appellate review on this issue as "correction of error, no deference." Brief of Appellant 
(hereinafter, "Appellant's Br.") at 1 (citing Morton v. Continental Baking Co., 938 P.2d 
271, 274 (Utah 1997)). To the contrary, appellate courts review the grant or denial of a 
motion to compel for abuse of discretion. See Pack v. Case, 2001 UT App 232, % 16, 30 
P.3d 436; Nova Cos. Co. v. Able Constr., Inc., 1999 UT 69, % 6, 983 P.2d 575. 
2. Did the trial court correctly conclude that Aurora violated the court's April 
8, 2003 Order by refusing to provide any responsive information to Defendants and, in 
particular, by failing to produce at least two specific categories of information requested 
by Defendants and ordered produced by the court? 
a. Standard of Review. Although Aurora identified the standard of 
review on this issue as "correction of error, no deference/5 Appellant's Br. at 1, the 
question of whether Aurora violated the April 8, 2003 Order is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion, see Sierra Club v. Cedar Point Oil Co., Inc., 73 F.3d 546, 569 (5th Cir. 1996) 
(stating that standard of review for trial court's finding that party violated discovery order 
is abuse of discretion), and the factual findings underlying the determination are reviewed 
for clear error. See United States v. National Medical Enterprises, Inc., 792 F.2d 906, 
911 (9 Cir. 1986). "A district judge's determination that an order was not complied 
with is entitled to considerable weight because the district judge is best equipped to judge 
the circumstances of the noncompliance." Id. 
3. Did the trial court act within its broad discretion in sanctioning Aurora for 
failure to comply with the court's April 8, 2003 Order? 
a. Standard of Review. Although Aurora has properly indicated that the 
standard of review for a trial court's imposition of discovery sanctions is abuse of 
discretion, see Morton, 938 P.2d at 274, it is important to note that the standard is 
extremely deferential in cases involving the imposition of discovery sanctions: 
"'Because trial courts must deal first hand with the parties and the 
discovery process, they are given broad discretion regarding the imposition 
of discovery sanctions.'" Thus, we have long held that we will not interfere 
unless '"abuse of that discretion [is] clearly shown.'" We will find that a 
trial court has abused its discretion in choosing which sanction to impose 
only if there is either "an erroneous conclusion of law or . . . no evidentiary 
basis for the trial court's ruling." 
Id. at 274 (Utah 1997) (citations omitted) (emphasis and alterations in original). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Copies of Rules 5 and 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are included as 
Exhibits "A" and "B" to the Addendum hereto. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Aurora obtained a security interest in Liberty West stock owned by James Hogle, 
Jr. ("Mr. Hogle"), one of Liberty West's founders, in approximately late 1991. Aurora 
obtained the security interest by purchasing a package of assets that included a pledge of 
Mr. Hogle's stock as security for payment of a judgment in an unrelated matter. Aurora 
did not purport to foreclose on its security interest in the Liberty West stock until April 
1993. 
On May 15, 1991, due to Liberty West's financial difficulties and inability to pay 
its debts, a creditor of Liberty West held a foreclosure sale on Liberty West's primary 
asset, which was an office complex located in Ogden, Utah (the "Ogden Property"). 
Despite the fact that Aurora held nothing but a security interest in the Liberty West stock 
until 1993, which was nearly two years after the foreclosure sale on the Ogden Property, 
Aurora thereafter developed a belief that the foreclosure sale was improper. In 1994, 
Aurora filed suit against Liberty West, Mr. Gay and XM based upon alleged 
improprieties in the sale. 
This case has now been ongoing for nearly eleven years. It has been assigned to 
three different trial court judges, has already been through one appeal, and has been 
characterized by Aurora's refusal to honor the trial court's orders, including by refusing 
to produce the discovery at issue in this appeal and by repeatedly refusing to take "no" 
for an answer. Indeed, after nearly ever unfavorable ruling, Aurora engaged in 
distracting and dilatory tactics, all of which were designed to take second bites at the 
proverbial apple. For example, Aurora filed at least two "motions to alter and amend" 
orders entered by the court, a number of "objections" to proposed orders, and numerous 
similar filings. 
It is against this eleven-year backdrop of contumacious conduct by Aurora that the 
trial court's dismissal of the action must be viewed. Utah courts have repeatedly 
recognized that trial court judges are in the best position to evaluate the discovery process 
as well as the appropriate sanction for abuse of the process. As a result, their decisions 
regarding discovery, including the imposition of sanctions, are reviewed with a high level 
of deference. In this case, for example, it is clear that no abuse of discretion occurred. 
The trial court properly granted Defendants' motion to compel, and then properly 
concluded that Aurora violated the court's order on the subject. 
The trial court also acted within its discretion by sanctioning Aurora for its willful 
refusal to produce certain critical information, including but not limited to information 
sufficient to identify Aurora's poorly-defmed claims and copies of notes taken by 
Aurora's president that Aurora first promised to produce on January 23, 2001—several 
years before the trial court decided it need not wait any longer. The relevance of the 
initial category of documents is obvious. To defend against Aurora's claims, Defendants 
were obviously entitled to have Aurora identify the claims and the evidence supporting 
the claims. 
The second category of documents was at least equally critical especially in light 
of the Utah Supreme Court's opinion in the first appeal of this matter. See Aurora Credit 
Sews., Inc. v. Liberty West Dew, Inc., 970 P.2d 1273 (Utah 1998) {"Aurora F). In 
Aurora 7 the Supreme Court held that the only way in which Aurora could have standing 
to maintain either its direct or derivative claims was under a narrow exception to the 
contemporaneous stock-ownership rule. More specifically, because Aurora was not a 
shareholder of Liberty West when the Ogden Property was sold, Aurora must establish 
that it fell within the fraudulent concealment exception to the rule. Aurora's primary 
allegation supporting its claim to this exception is that Defendants purportedly told 
Aurora that they were attempting to sell the Odgen Property, which allegedly was no 
longer true after May of 1991. Id. at 1279-80. Accordingly, the contemporaneous notes 
made by Aurora's president, reflecting statements made to Aurora by Defendants and/or 
related parties, were extremely relevant, and in fact may have been the only documentary 
evidence to support Aurora's claim of fraudulent concealment. As recognized by the trial 
court, Defendants' ability to put on a defense was seriously hampered by Aurora's willful 
and repeated refusal to produce this information, which was in flagrant violation of the 
trial court's order. For these and other reasons discussed herein, the trial court's 
judgment should be affirmed. 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
A. The First Dismissal 
Aurora filed suit against Defendants in August 1994, asserting both direct claims 
and derivative claims on behalf of Liberty West's shareholders. See R. at 1. Defendants 
promptly responded with a Motion to Dismiss, based primarily upon Aurora's lack of 
standing to assert direct claims against Liberty West and Mr. Gay. See R. at 13-14. The 
trial court granted Defendants' motion in part, dismissing Counts III through VTI1 of the 
complaint to the extent they asserted direct claims by Aurora against Liberty West and 
Mr. Gay. See R. at 139. As the court explained in a subsequent order, in response to 
Aurora's submission of its "Request for Findings and to Amend Judgment or 
Complaint,"2 Aurora could not maintain certain claims directly against Liberty West and 
Mr. Gay because the alleged injury was to Liberty West, not to Aurora, and the claims 
therefore belonged to the corporation. See R. at 171-174. 
On July 31, 1995, Defendants moved for partial summary judgment on Aurora's 
alleged derivative claims. See R. at 219. Defendants argued that Aurora lacked standing 
to maintain the claims based upon the well established "contemporary ownership rule," 
which provides that a shareholder cannot maintain a derivative action on behalf of a 
corporation unless the shareholder owned stock in the corporation at the time of the 
alleged injury. See R. at 234-240. On December 22, 1995, the trial court granted the 
1
 Counts III through VII alleged mismanagement, breach of fiduciary duty and similar, 
but largely unspecified, claims. 
" This is just the first of many instances in which Aurora refused to accept a ruling from 
the trail court. 
summary judgment motion and dismissed Counts III through VII of Aurora's First 
Amended Complaint to the extent they asserted derivative claims on behalf of Liberty 
West. See R. at 234-40. Aurora again moved to alter or amend the court's summary 
judgment ruling, and to amend its complaint, but the trial court denied these motions. See 
R. at 414. 
B. The First Appeal 
Aurora appealed the dismissal of its direct claims and the summary judgment on 
its derivative claims following the trial court's Rule 54(b) certification. See R. at 462-65. 
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in granting 
Defendants' motion partial summary judgment on Aurora's derivative claims and in 
dismissing Aurora's direct claims. See Aurora /, 970 P.2d at 1282. The court also held 
that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Aurora's motion to amend its 
complaint. See id. With respect to the trial court's entry of summary judgment on the 
derivative claims, the Utah Supreme Court held that, although Aurora lacked standing to 
bring the derivative claims under the traditional contemporaneous ownership doctrine, 
there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether Aurora had standing by virtue of 
the "fraudulent concealment exception" to the doctrine. See id. at 1279. Due to the 
factual nature of this inquiry, the Utah Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court 
to determine the applicability of the exception. See id. Because Aurora would only have 
standing if the fraudulent concealment exception were satisfied, documents and evidence 
regarding Defendants' representations to Aurora at and after the time when Aurora claims 
to have become a shareholder of Liberty West became critically important to the case. 
With respect to Aurora's direct claims, the court held that minority shareholders of 
closely held corporations may proceed directly against corporate officers where the 
shareholder suffered an injury "distinct from that suffered by the corporation." Id. at 
1280. However, the court went on to hold that, just as with derivative actions, the 
minority shareholder must meet the contemporaneous ownership standard of Rule 23.1. 
See id. at 1280-81. Accordingly, the question on remand was the same as the one for the 
derivative claims, namely, whether Aurora would be permitted to bring its direct claims 
based upon the fraudulent concealment exception to the contemporaneous ownership 
rule.3 See id. at 1281. Again, documents and evidence on this point became critical. 
C. Remand to the Trial Court 
Following the issuance of the Utah Supreme Court's opinion, the parties 
recommenced their discovery efforts, see, e.g., R. at 674, 696, 868. In addition, 
Defendants filed a motion requesting a separate trial on the issue of standing. See R. at 
768. The basis for this motion was that, since the Utah Supreme Court had remanded on 
the issue of standing, that issue should be resolved separately, and first, because if 
resolved in favor of Defendants, a full-blown trial on the merits would not be required. 
SeeR. at 771-72. 
On November 30, 1999, the court granted Aurora's motion to amend its 
complaint. R. at 811-812. By the same Order, the trial court continued Defendants' 
motion for a separate trial "until such time as the court is more fully advised through 
3
 The court also ruled that the trial court's denial of Aurora's motion to amend its 
complaint was a basis for reversal, as the trial court had failed adequately to explain its 
reasoning for denying the motion. See R. at 1282. 
plaintiffs amended complaint, defendant's answer, and discovery conducted by the 
parties as to the propriety of separate trials in this case." R. at 812 (emphasis added). 
Aurora filed its Second Amended Complaint on March 21, 2000, which added three new 
causes of action against Defendants. See R. at 846. 
On October 19, 2001, Defendants again moved for summary judgment, this time 
on the basis that Aurora had not met its burden to establish the fraudulent concealment 
exception to the contemporaneous ownership rule. See R. at 1140. The court denied the 
motion by Memorandum Decision and Order on August 1, 2002, emphasizing that there 
were questions of fact "whether 'affirmative steps to conceal wrongdoing' from [Aurora] 
were undertaken'1 between April 1993, when Aurora claims to have foreclosed on its 
interest in Liberty West stock, and July 1993, when Aurora learned of the foreclosure 
sale.4 See R. at 1304, 1306. 
1. TJie Second Set of Requests 
On December 4, 2002, in accordance with the court's denial of then motion for 
summary judgment, and shortly after Defendants obtained new counsel, Defendants 
served a second set of discovery requests on Aurora, which consisted of requests for 
production of documents and interrogatories (the "Second Set of Requests"). See R. at 
1384. Among other documents and information, the Second Set of Requests formally 
sought certain information that Aurora's counsel had previously promised but failed to 
provide to Defendants. Specifically, the Second Set of Requests sought (1) Mr. Zak's 
4
 A copy of the trial court's August 1, 2002 Order is attached as Exhibit "C" to the 
Addendum hereto. 
handwritten notes of conversations with Mr. Gay and others, which Mi". Zak explicitly 
stated were in existence and his counsel promised to produce, albeit in redacted form, at 
Mr. Zak's deposition on January 23, 2001, see R. at 1481, 1519, 1532-33; (2) a complete 
copy of Aurora's first set of document production, which Aurora's counsel had also 
agreed to provide, see R. at 1480-81, 1519; and (3) an explanation of Aurora's claims, 
including identification and clarification of each of the claims, and evidence supporting 
them, which Aurora also had previously promised to provide. See R. at 1481, 1507-08. 
Incredibly, even though Aurora's counsel agreed in these telephone conversations to 
produce the documents and information requested by Defendants, Aurora refused to do 
so, forcing the motions to compel. 
Defendants served the Second Set of Requests by mail on Aurora's counsel at 
2258 South Wilshire Circle, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84109. See R. at 1383, 1385. As 
Defendants later discovered, this address contained a single-digit typographical error— 
the correct address is apparently 2558 South Wilshire Circle, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
84109. Despite the error in the address, however, Aurora's counsel admitted that he 
received the Second Set of Requests about one week after they were mailed to him, or by 
approximately December 11, 2003. See R. at 1569. Aurora's responses to the Second 
Set of Requests were therefore due on January 6, 2003. See R. at 1478. 
Defendants heard nothing from Aurora regarding the Second Set of Requests until 
January 10, 2003—four days after the Aurora's responses were due—when counsel for 
Aurora informed Defendants' counsel by telephone that Aurora did not intend to respond 
to the Second Set of Requests at all. See R. at 1478, 1524. Aurora's counsel stated that 
he would be moving to strike the Second Set of Requests because a prior court order 
precluded Defendants from conducting further discovery. See id. 
2. Hie Motion to Compel 
On January 14, 2003, having received no response to the Second Set of Requests, 
Defendants moved to compel. See R. at 1534. As Defendants explained in the 
memorandum supporting the motion, Aurora not only refused to respond to the Second 
Set of Requests but also failed to file any objection to the requests and failed to move for 
a protective order. See R. at 1476. Instead, on January 16, 2003, ten days after the 
responses were due, Aurora filed a motion to strike the Second Set of Requests. Aurora 
argued that a prior court order prohibited Defendants from conducting additional 
discovery and that Defendants' decision to propound the requests was contrary to prior 
representations made in the litigation. See R. at 1539. Aurora did not make any mention 
of, or otherwise refer to the sendee of, the Second Set of Requests in its motion to strike. 
In fact, Aurora did not file its opposition to the motion to compel until January 27, 2003, 
when it raised for the first time its argument that it was not required to respond to the 
Second Set of Requests because it was mailed to the wrong address. See R. at 1574. 
The trial court held a hearing on the pending motions, including Defendants' 
motion to compel and Aurora's motion to strike, on March 26, 2003, which was more 
than tliree months after the Second Set of Requests was served. See R. at 3347. Among 
other things, the court considered and rejected the argument that the Second Set of 
Requests had been improperly served, stating, "Well, I understand that. I don't need to 
hear that." R. at 3347, p. 32. The court further ruled as follows: 
Here's what I'm going to do in this matter. I am going to allow 
additional discovery by the defendants in this matter to the plaintiffs. I'm 
also going to allow plaintiffs additional time in this matter. All discovery 
in this case will be completed sixty days from today's date. Operative word 
is completed, gentlemen. This case is almost as old as my children. 
R. at 3347, pp. 33-34. 
Defendants subsequently submitted a proposed order on the motions, and Aurora 
characteristically took the opportunity to re-argue its positions by objecting to the "form" 
of the order. In reality, Aurora's objection was to the order's substance, not its form. 
Among other things, Aurora claimed that the court did not grant Defendant's motion to 
compel but instead simply stated that it would "allow additional discovery by 
defendants." R. at 1713-14. 
The trial court rejected Aurora's objections and entered Defendants' proposed 
order, with certain minor changes, on April 8, 2003.3 The April 8 Order provided, in 
relevant part, as follows: 
Defendants' Motion to Compel is GRANTED, and Plaintiffs Motion to 
Strike is DENIED. Plaintiff Aurora Credit Sendees, Inc. will respond to 
Defendants' Second Set of Interrogatories to Plaintiff and Defendants' 
Second Set of Requests for Production of Documents, within thirty (30) 
days from April 18, 2003. 
R. at 1751. Although the original proposed order submitted by Defendants stated that 
Aurora must respond to the Second Set of Requests within thirty7 days from March 26, 
2003, the court scratched out that date and replaced it with April 18, 2003, thus giving 
Aurora about three additional weeks to respond to the discovery requests. See R. at 1751. 
D
 A copy of the April 8, 2003 Order is attached as Exhibit "I)" to the Addendum hereto. 
The court also imposed a deadline for the completion of all discovery in the case for sixty 
days from March 26, 2003. See R. at 1752.6 
Despite the fact that Aurora still had over two weeks in which to comply with the 
April 8 Order by responding to the Second Set of Requests. Aurora proceeded to file a 
flurry of motions and other papers. On May 5. 2003, Aurora moved the court to appoint 
a special master to deal with the discover}7 issues in the case. See R. at 1790. On May 7, 
2003, Aurora served what it claimed were its responses to the Second Set of Requests on 
Defendants. See R. at 1794-95. These "responses," however, provided extremely little 
information in response to Defendants' interrogatories and refused to produce any 
documents at all. See R. at 1936-1954. On May 12, 2003, Aurora moved for a protective 
order to delay the deposition of Aurora's President, Charles F. Zak ("Mr. Zak"), which 
was then noticed for May 15, 2003. See R. at 1798. On the same day, Aurora filed a 
document entitled "Motion to Toll Discovery Deadline for Period of Special Master's 
Review of Discovery Issues and Request for Immediate Hearing," R. at 1803, asking the 
trail court to extend the sixty-day discovery period. 
3. The Motion for Sanctions 
On May 22, 2003, having received only Aurora's "responses" to the Second Set of 
Requests but not havmg received a single document requested therein, Defendants filed a 
motion requesting the imposition of Rule 37 sanctions. See R. at 1809. Defendants' 
6
 So there would be no confusion on the issue of sendee, Defendants re-served their 
Second Set of Requests on April 2, 2003, shortly after the trial court's oral ruling on the 
motion to compel at the March 26, 2003 hearing. See R. at 1730-31. 
motion explained that the court's April 8, 2003 Order did not merely require the sendee 
of a written response to the Second Set of Requests, but that the Order required Aurora to 
actually produce certain categories of documents, including (1) Mr. Zak's handwritten 
notes of conversations with Mr. Gay and others following Aurora's purported foreclosure 
on its interest in Liberty West stock; (2) a complete copy of Aurora's first set of 
document production; and (3) an explanation of Aurora's claims, including identification 
and clarification of each of the claims and the bases for the claims. See R. at 1915. 
Defendants filed two additional motions on May 22, 2003, including a Motion to 
Dismiss Aurora's third, fourth, and sixth through tenth claims for relief, see R. at 1844, 
and a Motion for Summary Judgment. See R. at 1866. As discussed below, however, 
these motions were ultimately rendered moot by virtue of the court's ruling on the motion 
for Rule 37 sanctions. 
The hearing on the motion for sanctions did not occur until May 5, 2004, and, 
although the briefing on each of Defendants' May 22, 2003 motions was finally 
completed by February 6, 2004, see R. at 2134, Aurora failed to take advantage of the 
interim period. Instead producing the requested documents, moving for an extension of 
time, providing a privilege Jog, or moving for a protective order, for example, Aurora 
filed yet another round of motions, including a forty-five page motion to strike an 
affidavit, see R. at 2389, and a motion for partial summary judgment on the issues of 
Aurora's motion to strike the affidavit of Mary E. Anderson provides a further example 
of Aurora's persistent disrespect for the trial court's orders. As mentioned, Aurora's 
memorandum in support of this motion was forty-five pages long. Although Aurora filed 
a motion for leave to submit an overlength memorandum, see R. at 2383, the trial court 
standing and liability for "various claims of plaintiff herein." R. at 2551. Following the 
hearing, the trial court took the matter under advisement. See R. at 2380. 
On June 10, 2004, the court issued a minute entry explaining its ruling on the 
motions addressed at the May 5, 2004, hearing.9 See R. at 3261. Specifically, the trial 
court imposed two sanctions on Aurora for failing to comply with its Order and 
Defendants1 discover}7 requests. First, Aurora would be precluded from using or relying 
upon any testimony related to the alleged conversations between Mr. Zak and Mr. Gay. 
See R. at 3261-62. Second, the court dismissed Aurora's Second Amended Complaint, 
stating that Aurora had failed "to identify its claims and evidence in support thereof." R. 
at 3262. 
The minute entry explained the basis for the court's rulings as follows: 
On April 8, 2003 this Court entered an Order granting defendants' Motion 
to Compel and denying plaintiffs Motion to Strike. Consistent with its 
Order, the court explicitly required plaintiff Aurora to respond to 
defendants' second set of interrogatories and second set of requests for 
production of documents within thirty (30) days, with discovery to be 
completed in sixty (60) days. Plaintiff has failed to do so. To this day. 
granted the motion only in part, permitting Aurora to file a memorandum of twenty-five 
pages in length. See R. at 2462. Rather than comply with this directive, Aurora simply 
re-filed the first nineteen pages of its original memorandum, with the remaining eighteen 
or so pages attached as an addendum thereto. See R. at 2493-2529. Interestingly, the 
pages of the Addendum were unnumbered. The trial court indicated its frustration with 
this trickery at the subsequent hearing. See R. at 3348, pp. 3-4. 
After the May 5 hearing, Aurora filed another motion for summary judgment and 
memorandum in support thereof, see R. at 2965, as well as yet another memorandum in 
support of its prior motion to strike. See R. at 2968. 
9
 A copy of the June 10, 2004 minute entry is included as Exhibit "E" to the Addendum 
hereto. 
Aurora Credit has failed, in direct contravention of the Court's Order, to 
provide defendants with basic documents and information crucial to its 
defense of this case: the handwritten notes of Charles Zak regarding 
conversations with James Hogle, Tony Versteeg and Lonnie Anderson, 
relevant documents taken from Liberty West Development by a former 
employee, and identification of and basis for the claims alleged. 
R. at 3261 (emphasis added). Addressing the argument that Aurora adequately responded 
to the Second Set of Requests by filing its "response" thereto on May 7, 2003, the court 
stated: 
While the Court recognizes that on May 7, 2003 Aurora served defendants 
with "written responses", such responses were wholly inadequate. 
Additionally, Aurora refused to produce the requested documentation 
imperative to defendants' defense. 
R. at 3261, n.l. An Order reflecting the findings and conclusions set forth in the minute 
entry was entered on July 13, 2004.10 R. at 3276. 
In typical fashion, Aurora filed yet another motion to "alter or amend" following 
the entry of the July 13, 2004 Order. See R.3280. On November 10, 2004, after the 
motion had been fully briefed by the parties, the trial court denied Aurora's motion.11 
See R. at 3328-29. Aurora filed its notice of appeal on December 9, 2004. See R. at 
HI. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Because the nature of the issues on appeal is procedural, the facts underlying the 
litigation are largely immaterial to this appeal. The following discussion nevertheless 
provides a sketch of the case's factual background. 
10
 A copy of the July 13, 2004 Order is included as Exhibit "F" to the Addendum hereto. 
11
 A copy of November 10, 2004 Order is attached as Exhibit "G" to the Addendum 
hereto. 
Mr. Gay, James Hogle Jr. ("Mr. Hogle"), and two other individuals formed 
Liberty West in 1986 for the purpose of developing commercial real estate. See R. at 
1156 % 3. Liberty West borrowed money to develop an office building in Ogden, Utah 
(the "Ogden Property"), which was secured by a note and mortgage on the property. See 
R. at 1156 fflj 4-5. After construction was completed, the Ogden Property was leased to 
the Internal Revenue Sendee (the "IRS"). See R. at 222 % 5. 
Despite the IRS lease, by 1989, Liberty West was having financial difficulties, 
including being unable to make the payments due on its loan for the Ogden Property, and 
numerous creditors had placed liens against the Ogden Property. See R. at 1156 f 7. In 
early 1991, a creditor of Liberty West named Restaurant Store & Equipment Supply 
Company, Inc. ("Pvestauranr Store") sued Liberty West for nonpayment on a contract and 
obtained a monetary judgment against it. See R. at 1157 H 11. Restaurant Store 
subsequently obtained a Writ of Execution and, on April 24, 1991, the Weber County 
Sheriff recorded a lew on the Ogden Property with the Weber County Recorder's Office. 
SeeR. at 1157-584 11. 
On May 15, 1991, the Weber County7 Sheriff conducted a sheriffs sale of the 
Ogden Property pursuant to Restaurant Store's Writ of Execution. Restaurant Store was 
the highest bidder at the sale and, in fact, the only bidder to appear. See R. at 1157-57, 
Ul l . The Weber County Sheriff therefore issued a certificate of the sale to Restaurant 
Store, which was recorded with the Weber County Recorder on June 3, 1993. R. at 1144-
45 % 6; R a t 1168. 
Liberty West's six-month redemption period for the Ogden Property expired on 
November 15, 1991. R. at 290 f^ 3. Due to ongoing losses and the shareholders' desire 
not to put more money into the enterprise, Liberty West's shareholders ultimately 
determined not to redeem the Ogden Property. Among other factors affecting this 
decision was the discovery of a major underground petroleum contamination from a 
neighboring manufacturing plant. R. at 1158 % 15. 
On May 20, 1991, XM, which at the time was a general partnership owned jointly 
by Mr. Gay and an individual named George Bybee, who was not an owner of Liberty 
West, purchased the Ogden Property from Restaurant Store. R. at 1158 % 12. XM has 
been the equitable and beneficial owner of the Property since May 20, 1991. See R. at 
115% ^ 12; see also R. at 29-30. 
Aurora did not obtain any interest in Liberty West until late 1991, at which point it 
acquired only a security interest in Liberty West stock then-owned by Mr. Hogle. In the 
late 1980s, Mr. Hogle had been sued in another state for an unrelated debt owed to Union 
National Bank of Chicago ("UNBC"), which obtained a monetary judgment against him 
(the "Hogle Judgment"). R. at 1157 If 8. UNBC's assets, including the Hogle Judgment, 
were subsequently assumed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"). R. 
at 1157 Tf 8. On February 20, 1991, Mr. Hogle executed a security agreement in favor of 
the FDIC, in which he pledged his 2,500 shares of Liberty West stock as collateral for the 
judgment. See R. at 1157, 2137. On November 21, 1990, Mr. Gay, then-president of 
Liberty West, sent the unendorsed stock certificates owned by Mr. Hogle to the FDIC 
together with another document signed by Mr. Hogle entitled "Irrevocable Stock or Bond 
Power/' confirming the FDIC's security interest in the Hogle Shares. See R. at 1157 f^ 9. 
On November 22, 1991. Aurora, whose primary business is acquiring assets from 
the FDIC, the Resolution Trust Corporation and other financial institutions for collection, 
see R. at 356, purchased a package of assets, which included the Hogle Judgment, from 
the FDIC at a judgment auction.12 See R. at 74 % 6. However, Aurora did not become a 
shareholder of Liberty West until two years later, in April 1993, when it purportedly 
foreclosed on the Liberty West stock. R. at 2901J 5. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Aurora raises three main arguments in its appeal, none of which is sufficient to 
warrant reversal. First, Aurora claims that the trial court committed a legal error by 
granting Defendants' motion to compel because the Second Set of Requests were served 
with a single-digit typographical error, and therefore were not served in accordance with 
Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Second, Aurora claims that the trial court 
incorrectly determined that Aurora violated the order granting Defendants' motion to 
compel. Third, assuming that Aurora fails on its first two arguments, Aurora contends 
that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing the sanctions of precluding it from 
relying on certain evidence and dismissing its Second Amended Complaint. 
Aurora's first argument is unavailing for a number of reasons, including, most 
obviously, the fact that its counsel admitted to receiving the Second Set of Requests 
" This was literally a few days after Liberty West's right of redemption on the property 
had expired. 
within a week of the date on which they were mailed, meaning that Aurora had plenty of 
time to respond and suffered no prejudice. The fact that the error in the address wras a 
minor typographical one, involving a single digit, also weighs heavily against this 
argument. Aurora also waived this argument in any event by accepting numerous other 
documents mailed to the same address. 
Likewise, Aurora cannot prevail on its second argument. Not only was the order 
granting Defendants' motion to compel entirely clear, the information subject to that 
order was also obvious. Even so, Aurora refused to produce the documents and 
information for another year following the filing of Defendants' sanctions motion. 
Among the information Aurora refused to produce were the notes taken by Mr. Zak of 
conversations with Mr. Gay and others, which Aurora first promised to provide to 
Defendants on January 23, 2001, In light of the Supreme Court's opinion on whether 
Aurora had standing to maintain its claims under the fraudulent concealment exception to 
the contemporaneous ownership doctrine, this evidence was incredibly relevant to the 
representations and/or omissions that were purportedly made to Aurora regarding the 
Ogden Property and, therefore, crucial to Defendants' ability to mount a defense to 
Aurora's claims. Aurora also refused to answer discovery requests regarding the 
identification and nature of its claims, which was equally critical to Defendants' ability to 
defend against Aurora's claims. 
Finally, in light of well established Utah case law and Aurora's obstinate conduct 
in this case, there is no question that the sanctions imposed by the trial court were just 
and proper, and that no abuse of discretion occurred. The trial court had the benefit of 
observing the conduct of the parties first hand, and there is ample support in the record 
for its conclusions regarding Aurora's stubborn and persistent refusal to comply with the 
court's Order. For these reasons, and as discussed more fully below, the judgment 
entered against Aurora should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WELL WITHIN ITS DISCRETION IN 
GRANTING THE MOTION TO COMPEL, INCLUDING BECAUSE 
AURORA ADMITTED IT RECEIPTED THE DISCOVERY REQUESTS 
The only argument Aurora raises to support its claim that the court improperly 
granted Defendants' motion to compel is one that was soundly rejected by the trial court, 
just as it should be by this Court. Simply. Aurora claims that the trial court should not 
and could not have granted Defendants' motion to compel because Defendants did not 
serve the Second Set of Requests in accordance with Rule 5(b)(1), which requires that 
service be made upon a party's attorney by delivering or mailing a copy of the document 
to the attorney's "last known address." UTAH R. Civ. P. 5(b)(1). According to Aurora, 
because Defendants did not mail the Second Set of Requests to its attorney's "last known 
address," Aurora was not required to respond, and the trial court should (or could) not 
have granted Defendants' motion to compel. Aurora's argument provides absolutely no 
basis for reversal. 
First, Aurora drastically overstates the error in the address to which the Second Set 
of Requests was sent. The trivial typographical error consisted of a single incorrect digit 
out of a four-digit number, i.e., what was meant to be 2558 was typed as 2258. This 
minor error did not render the service ineffective and did not preclude the trial court from 
reaching the merits of Defendants' motion to compel. Addressing a tax statute analogous 
to Rule 5(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which similarly requires sendee of 
delinquency notices on taxpayers at their "last known address," 26 U.S.C. § 6121(b)(1), 
courts have soundly rejected the same argument advanced by Aurora. Specifically, these 
courts have held that minor errors in the taxpayer's address, like the minor error in this 
case, do not affect the validity of the notice. See, e.g., In re Chabrand, 301 B.R. 468, 477 
(S.D. Tex. 2003) (holding that notice mailed to "2315 Silverado" rather than "2315 
Silverado S." was effective); Carlyle v. Commissioner, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 2457 (1993) 
(concluding that notice was effective where taxpayer received notice despite minor error 
in spelling of street name); Riley v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 1483 (1985) 
(same). 
Second, Aurora suffered no prejudice because it received actual notice of the 
Second Set of Discovery Requests in plenty of time to respond. Aurora's counsel 
admitted that he received the Second Set of Requests within "approximately one week 
after they were purportedly mailed by defendants' counsel." See Affidavit of Eric P. 
Hartman, R. at 1569 ^  4. Since the Second Set of Requests was mailed on December 4, 
2004, see R. at 1385, Aurora received it by December 11, 2002. This left Aurora with at 
least three weeks to respond to the Second Set of Requests, whether by preparing 
responses and objections, requesting an extension of time or filing a protective order. 
Aurora did none of the above. Instead, on January710, 2003, six days after Aurora's 
responses were due, Aurora's counsel pointedly informed Defendants that Aurora did not 
intend to respond to the requests. See R. at 1478, 1454. Further, on January 16, 2003— 
ten days after the responses were due and more than a month after the Second Set of 
Requests was served—Aurora filed an untimely motion to strike the discovery on the 
grounds that it conflicted with a prior order of the trial court. See R. at 1537. 
What's more, Aurora did not even raise the issue of whether the requests were 
properly served hi the motion to strike, instead waiting until January 27, 2003—nearly 
two full months after the discovery was served—to raise the issue hi its opposition to 
Defendants' motion to compel. See R. at 1576-79. By that time, Aurora had waived any 
objection it might have had regarding the manner in which the discovery requests were 
served. See Davis v. Fendler, 650 F.2d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 1981) ("Generally,... the 
failure to object to interrogatories within the time fixed by Rule 33 . . . constitutes a 
waiver of any objection.") (emphasis added); Land Ocean Logistics, Inc. v. Aqua Gulf 
Corp., 181 F.R.D. 229, 236 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) ("Courts have held that a failure to respond 
or object to a discovery request in a timely manner waives any objection which may have 
been available") (emphasis added). 
Third, courts routinely hold that actual notice or receipt of a discover}/ request is 
sufficient to impose a duty to respond. For example, in a case where the plaintiff served 
deposition notices on the defendant using an incorrect name, the court held that the 
defendant was obligated to comply because he had actually received the documents and 
thus "had notice that the plaintiff wished to take his deposition." Joujou Designs, Inc. v. 
Jojo Ligne Internationale, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 1347, 1350 (N.D. Ca. 1996); see also Tong 
Seae (U.S.A.), Inc. v. Edmar Corp., 81 B.R. 593 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1988) (upholding 
dismissal under Rule 37(b)(2)(C) where, once defendant received actual notice of the 
district court's discover}7 order, it was no longer justified in refusing to respond to 
discovery). Similarly, here there is no question that Aurora received the discovery 
requests, had actual notice, and was therefore obligated to respond. 
Although no Utah case has addressed the precise issue in this case, Utah Courts 
are in unanimous agreement with this principle. In fact, the Utah Court of Appeals 
applied a similar rationale in Lincoln Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. D. T. Southern Properties, 
838 P.2d 672, 675 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), where it held that a party's failure to serve a 
copy of a default judgment as required by the rules "does not invalidate the default 
judgment." The Court explained: 
Notwithstanding the argument that [plaintiffs] failed to give notice, 
[defendant] received notice of the default judgment on July 18, 1990, when 
he was personally served with the court's order in supplemental 
proceedings. This notice, which [defendant] received approximately seven 
weeks after the court entered default judgment, provided him adequate 
opportunity to timely move to set aside the default judgment. 
Id. (affirming trial court's denial of motion to set aside default judgment). Certainly, the 
timely service of a set of discovery requests at an address with a minor, single-digit 
typographical error should receive commensurate treatment, especially in light of 
Aurora's admission that it received the requests within a week of the mailing date. 
Fourth, because Aurora previously accepted sendee at the incorrect address, it was 
estopped from claiming the sendee was ineffective. Aurora received the Second Set of 
Discovery Requests in ample time to respond, and Aurora had previously received 
sendee of documents and pleadings that contained the same typographical error in the 
address. For instance, Aurora made no objection to the service of Defendants' motion to 
compel, which was mailed to the same address. See R. at 1536. The same is true of the 
sendee of Defendants' (1) Notice of Substitution of Counsel, see R. at1319-1321; (2) Ex 
Parte Motion for Order Substituting Counsel, see R. at 1329-1331; (3) Ex Parte Motion 
for Extension of Time to Respond to Outstanding Discovery, see R. at 1326-1328: and 
(4) Defendants5 Supplemental Responses to Plaintiffs Second Set of Interrogatories and 
Requests for Production of Documents, see R. at 1382-83, all of which were mailed to the 
address containing the same typographical error. As a consequence, Aurora had a duty to 
respond to the Second Set of Requests, and it waived any objection it may have had to the 
service thereof. 
Fifth, none of the cases upon which Aurora relies advances its position. For 
example, Aurora cites New York Life Insurance Co. v. Brown, 84 F.3d 137, 141 (5 Cir. 
1996) in support of its assertion that Defendants' sendee of the Second Set of Requests at 
the wrong address is "fatally defective." Appellant's Br. at 16. This is a vast 
overstatement. The New York Life opinion does not so hold and is readily distinguishable 
from this case. In New York Life, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district 
court's refusal to set aside a summary judgment because the defendant had never 
received a copy of the motion for summary judgment and because the clerk of the court 
mailed the motion to an address that it knew or should have known was invalid. See id. 
at 142. Because the defendant had been entirely deprived of "the opportunity to be 
heard," the summary judgment was void on constitutional due process grounds. Id. at 
143. 
In this case, by contrast, Aurora received actual notice of the Second Set of 
Requests in plenty of time to take action and, in fact, Aurora did take action by belatedly 
filing a motion to strike. Indeed, the trial court considered the merits of Aurora's motion 
despite its untimely filing, and so Aurora certainly was not deprived of its "right to be 
heard." Moreover, there is a substantial difference in consequences arising from the 
documents of which the parties claim not to have received notice—whereas in New York 
Life the defendant was not notified of a motion for entry of an actual judgment, resulting 
a denial of due process, in this case Aurora claims not to have received a set of discovery, 
which it actually did receive. 
Aurora also mistakenly relies on J.D. Pharmaceutical Distributors, Inc. v. Save-
On Drugs & Cosmetics Corp., 893 F.2d 1201 (11th Cir. 1990) to support its claim that the 
"improper" sendee of the Second Set of Requests was fatal. Appellant's Br. at 16. The 
trial court in that case had entered summary judgment against each of two defendants 
(among others) on the basis of their failure to respond to the plaintiffs requests for 
admission. See J.D. Pharmaceutical, 893 F.2d at 1203. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals reversed the summary judgment as to one of the defendants, but 
affirmed with respect to the other. See id. at 1208-1209. The court held that the entry of 
summary judgment against the first defendant was improper because the record showed 
that she never received notice of either the requests for admissions or the motion for 
summary judgment. See id. at 1208. On the other hand, the court held that the summary 
judgment against the second defendant was proper because he had actually received both 
the requests for admission and the motion for summary judgment. See id. at 1208-09. 
The court's reasoning was sound. Like Aurora, the second defendant in J.D. 
Pharmaceutical was not prevented from responding—he shnply elected not to do so. See 
id. at 1209. Thus, J.D. Pharmaceutical supports Defendants' position—because Aurora 
received actual notice of the Second Set of Requests, it was obligated to respond, and its 
failure to do so justified the trial court's grant of Defendants' motion to compel. 
Aurora's reliance upon Timmons v. United States, 194 F.2d 357 (4m Cir. 1952), 
and United States v. Brandt, 8 F.R.D. 163 (D. Mont. 1948), is similarly misplaced. Like 
J.D. Pharmaceutical, both Timmons and Brandt involve the entry of judgment against 
parties who failed to respond to requests for admission. The Timmons court affirmed the 
entry of judgment against the defendant, despite her claim that she never received the 
requests for admission, because the requests were served by mail in accordance with the 
rules. See Timmons, 194 F.2d at 359. In contrast, the Brandt court reversed the entry of 
summary judgment against the defendants because there was no proof that they had 
actually received the requests for admission, and the certificate of service failed to 
specify the address to which the requests were mailed. See Brandt, 8 F.R.D. at 165-66. 
Due to Aurora's admission that it actually received the Second Set of Requests, this case 
is clearly much more like Timmons than Brandt. The judgment against Aurora should 
accordingly be affirmed. 
Both Bjorlin v. United States, 10 F.R.D. 42 (N.D. Ohio 1950), and Merchants' 
Groceiy Co. v. Merchants' Trust & Banking Co., 80 So. 494 (Miss. 1919), also fail to 
support Aurora's assertion that it was not required to respond to the Second Set of 
Requests. In Bjorlin, the court refused to compel the defendant to produce the names and 
address of witnesses to an accident on the basis that no interrogatories were served at all, 
see id. at 43, whereas in this case the motion to compel was granted only after Aurora 
failed to respond to the Second Set of Requests it actually received. Merchants Groceiy 
is similarly inapposite. The case, which is based upon an outdated rule of civil procedure 
in effect in Mississippi in 1919, held simply that an out-of-state defendant had no 
obhgation to respond to interrogatories that were served on its attorney because the rule, 
at the time, required an affidavit of service by a sheriff, constable or marshal, which did 
not occur in that case. Id. at 494. No similar issue exists in this case. 
Finally, Aurora relies on Southland Construction v. Semnani, 2001 UT 6, 20 P.3d 
875, for the proposition that "sendee must rigorously conform to the rules to be a valid 
basis on which a court may act." Appellant's Br. at 16. Unfortunately for Aurora, the 
proposition for which Southland Conswuction stands is not nearly so broad as it claims. 
Similarly to the New York Life case discussed above, Southland Construction deals with 
the entry of a default judgment, not a motion to compel, and with the service of a 
summons, not a set of discovery. Southland Constr., 2001 UT 6, at fflj 4-5. As a result, 
the court's reversal of the default judgment in Southland Construction simply does not 
call for a similar result in this case. 
In sum, the trial court properly granted Defendants' motion to compel because 
Aurora timely received the Second Set of Bequests but willfully elected not to respond. 
II. THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT AURORA VIOLATED THE COURT'S 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO COMPEL 
Aurora claims the trial court's entry of sanctions against it was improper because 
it did not violate the April 8, 2003 Order (the "Order") granting Defendants' motion to 
compel. According to Aurora, the Order did not actually require it to provide any 
substantive information or to produce any actual documents; instead, the Order only 
required Aurora to file a written "response" setting forth its objections to the Second Set 
of Requests. See Appellant's Br. at 22-23. This position is indefensible. D 
A. Aurora Had More than Adequate Notice of What the Order Required 
Aurora first argues that the Order was insufficiently specific for it to determine 
because it did not put Aurora on notice that any substantive, specific responses to the 
Second Set of Requests were required. Aurora further claims that at the March 26, 2003 
hearing on the motion to compel did not shed any light on its obligations, because "the 
court was primarily deciding whether to allow defendants to conduct further discovery at 
all. No ruling was made as to the propriety of specific discovery requests." Appellant's 
Br. at 23. Aurora grossly lnischaracterizes the record in making this claim. 
First, the Order itself is clear and unequivocal. It states that that Defendants' 
motion to compel was "granted," and that Aurora's motion to strike the Second Set of 
lj
 Aurora also suggests that, in light of the trial court's earlier statement that it would 
appoint a special master, the court's decision to address the motion to compel itself, 
rather than appointing a special master, was somehow improper. Aurora cites no legal 
authority to support this position, because there is none. A trial court certainly has no 
obligation to inform the parties of its intention to address directly any particular motion in 
the proceedings, and is certainly entitled to remove any matter from a special master that 
it deems appropriate. 
Discovery was "denied." R. at 1751. Plainly, this means that Aurora was required to 
respond to the Second Set of Requests in accordance with the relief requested by 
Defendants in their motion to compel, and that Aurora was not relieved of this duty by 
virtue of its motion to strike. 
Second, the context in which the order was entered, along with the contents of the 
motion to compel, confirms this simple interpretation. "The specificity of an order is a 
question of fact that must be evaluated in the context and setting in which it was entered. 
Thus, to determine the clarity of an order, the court should first examine the 
circumstances in which it was entered." United States v. Cable News Network, Inc., 865 
F. Supp. 1549, 1552 (S.D. Fla. 1994). In this instance, the motion to compel addressed at 
least two specific categories of hiformation, both of which were also specifically 
addressed at the March 26, 2003 hearing on the motion to compel.14 Accordingly, there 
is no question that Aurora was required to provide this information at a minimum. 
The first specific category of information sought by the motion to compel was 
copies of notes taken by Aurora's president, Charles N. Zak, of conversations he had with 
Mr. Gay and others sometime following Aurora's acquisition of a security interest in Mr. 
Hogle's Liberty7 West stock. See R. at 1481, 1654-55. Mr. Zak referred to these notes in 
his deposition on January 23, 2001, and, at the same deposition, Aurora's counsel 
promised to produce the notes, albeit in redacted form if necessary. See R. at 1532-1533 
14
 Defendants had earlier also moved to compel Aurora to supply a complete copy of the 
first set of documents it had earlier produced in the case, because Defendants counsel had 
been unable to locate them in the files received from prior counsel. Despite its promise 
to do so, see, e.g., R. at 1481, 1529, Aurora also failed to produce these documents. 
("I think we'd be happy to go through these and black out anyihmg that would be under 
attorney/client privilege and so forth, and provide you with the rest."). Indeed, 
Defendants' ability to present a defense was seriously compromised by Aurora's refusal 
to provide these notes, which were clearly relevant to—and may have been the only 
documentary evidence on—the crucial issue of whether Aurora had standing under the 
fraudulent concealment exception to the contemporaneous ownership rule. See, e.g., R. 
at 3348. pp. 8-9, 53. Despite Defendants' request for and Aurora's counsel's promise to 
provide these notes at Mr. Zak's deposition in 200, despite the promise to provide the 
notes to Defendants' counsel in the Fall of 2002. despite Defendants' request for the 
notes in the Second Set of Requests in 2002, and despite the pointed and express 
discussion of the notes in Defendants' motion to compel and at the March 26, 2003 
healing on that motion. Aurora still maintains that it did not know it was required to 
produce these notes. This claim is both disingenuous and totally implausible. 
The second category of information addressed in the motion to compel was 
information and documents sufficient to clarify and identify Aurora's causes of action 
against Defendants, and the bases for the claims. See R. at 1481: R. at 1529; R. at 1654-
55. Due to a lack of clarity in Aurora's complaint. Defendants were unable specifically 
to identify certain of Aurora's claims and had therefore requested that Aurora identify its 
claims, the elements of the claims and any supporting evidence. Defendants first made 
this request in 2002 by telephone, and Aurora's counsel agreed to provide the 
information. See R. at 1529: R. at 3347. p. 12. Defendants confirmed this request in a 
subsequent letter, see R. at 1529, but Aurora still did not provide the information. 
Defendants then formalized the request in the Second Set of Requests in late 2002, see R. 
at 1506-09, and then moved to compel the information in 2003. See R. at 1475. 
Defendants discussed this request extensively in the motion to compel and at the March 
26, 2003 hearing. See R. at 1501, 1512; R. at 3347, pp. 12-13. As a result, Defendants' 
request for clarification and identification of Aurora's claims was clearly a subject of the 
Order, and Aurora was well aware of the issue. 
As the Utah Supreme Court stated, in a case cited, ironically, by Aurora, "[t]his is 
not a case where a confused and unassisted layman wras thrown out of the courthouse 
simply for missing a discovery deadline." Utah Dep 't ofTransp. v. Osguthorpe, 892 
P.2d 4, 7 (Utah 1995). Because there is no sense in which Aurora can claim that it lacked 
notice of what information and documents it was required to provide, the Order was 
sufficiently specific to have been violated by Aurora. 
B. The Trial Court Correcth Determined that Aurora Violated the Order 
by Refusing to Produce, Among Other Things, Mr. Zak's Notes and 
Information Sufficient to Identify Aurora's Claims 
It is equally clear that Aurora violated the Order. Aurora's argument with respect 
to this point is that the "response'' it served to the Second Set of Requests on May 7, 
2003, was adequate to comply with the Order. See, e.g., Appellant's Br. at 25. 
However, not only did Aurora's "response" come long after the due date for 
Aurora's responses to the Second Set of Requests, and after the court granted 
Defendants' motion to compel, but also the "response" provided almost no information in 
response to Defendants' interrogatories and refused to produce any of the requested 
documents—including the information specifically addressed in the motion to compel. 
Instead, the "response" merely asserted a litany of objections without providing any 
substantive information whatsoever. See R. at 1936-1954. 
Aurora ineffectually argues that the trial court's denial of Defendants' motion to 
expedite Aurora's discovery responses, which was filed after the court granted 
Defendants' motion to compel, shows that its "response" to the Second Set of Requests 
was sufficient. According to this argument, because the motion to expedite asked the 
court to rule that Aurora had waived its objections to the Second Set of Requests, and 
because the court denied the motion, Aurora was not only entitled to object to the 
requests but also was not required to provide any substantive information in response to 
the requests. Appellants Br. at 20-21, 24-25. However, because the court's disposition 
of the motion to expedite did not address Aurora's right to assert objections to the Second 
Set of Requests, it certainly was not dispositive of the issue.15 Moreover, even if Aurora 
were correct that the trial court permitted it to make its objections to the Second Set of 
Requests, which is highly debatable, Aurora's ability to object surely did not relieve it 
from providing at least the particular information at the heart of the dispute. 
For example, Aurora's responses to Defendants' document requests for 
information regarding Mi*. Zak's communications with Mr. Gay and others, including the 
notes relevant to the fraudulent concealment objection, were particularly evasive. In 
response to the request seeking documents referring to Mr. Gay and his associates, for 
instance, Aurora simply objected to the requests as "overbroad and unduly burdensome," 
" In fact, Defendants filed the motion primarily in an effort to meet the trial court's sixty-
day deadline for completion of discovery, and in an effort to obtain Ivlr. Zalc's notes prior 
to his deposition. See R. at 1740-44. 
and otherwise completely refused to respond. See R. at 1950. In response to the more 
specific request for the notes referred to by Mi". Zak in his deposition. Aurora asserted 
that all such documents were subject to the work product doctrine. See R. at 1952. 
Counsel for Aurora raised the work product objection again at the hearing on the motion 
for sanctions: 
THE COURT: Why haven't you delivered them? 
MR. HARTMAN: Because we objected to it, your honor. 
THE COURT: Right. But on what basis? You have no right to object to 
them, on what basis can you object to it? 
MR. HARTMAN: Because they are work product. 
THE COURT: Work product? You're talking about the notes of a 
conversation between the plaintiff and the defendant and you're claiming 
they're work product somehow? 
MR. HARTMAN: Sure. They are—they are prepared in anticipation of 
litigation, your Honor. The—the fact that defendants have—have stated 
that— 
THE COURT: Conversations between a plaintiff and a defendant, your 
argument to me is that they're work product? 
MR. HARTMAN: The notes— 
THE COURT: That's your argument? 
MR. HARTMAN: The notes of those conversation^] are work product. 
They are—they—they qualify, because they're—they are documents 
prepared in anticipation of litigation. . . . But furthermore, the important 
thing is that those notes are totally irrelevant because— 
R. at 3348, p. 34. As indicated, the court clearly rejected this argument, and the trial 
court's justified frustration with Aurora's specious position on this issue is apparent. 
Similarly, with respect to Defendants' interrogatory requesting identification of 
Aurora's claims and supporting evidence. Aurora objected "on the grounds that it is a 
pure question of law and outside the scope of Discovery under Rule 26." See R. at 1941. 
Aurora provided no other information or response to this interrogatory. Indeed, Aurora 
still claims that it made proper objections to and answered these requests in full by 
referring Defendants to "numerous previous discovery responses in which it had provided 
such information to defendants." Appellant's Br. at 26. As the trial court found, 
Aurora's refusal to identify its claims and the bases its claims was inadequate to comply 
with the Order. See R. at 3261. 
Aurora's refusal to provide responsive information and documents constituted a 
clear violation of the Order. It is well established that a failure to provide discovery need 
not be absolute to justify the imposition of sanctions. "No finding of a 'complete failure' 
to comply with discovery is required. Indeed, dismissal as a discovery sanction has been 
upheld for late or incomplete discovery responses." Hales v. Oldroyd, 2000 UT App 75, 
\ 18, 999 P.2d 588. Rule 37 and applicable case law provide ample support for this 
standard: 
Evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer, or response. For purposes of 
this subdivision, an evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer or response is 
to be treated as a failure to disclose, answer, or respond. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3); see also Sierra Club, 73 F.3d at 571 (concluding that trial court 
did not abuse discretion in ruling that defendant violated discovery order by providing 
incomplete disclosures of expert witnesses). 
In this case, as the trial court explained in its minute entry on the motion for 
sanctions, 
[w]hile the court recognizes that on May 75 2003 Aurora served defendant 
with 'written responses,' such responses were wholly inadequate. 
Additionally, Aurora refused to produce the requested documentation 
imperative to defendants' defense. 
R. at 3261, n.l (emphasis added). The trial court further explained its ruling as follows: 
On April 8, 2003 this court entered an Order granting defendants' Motion 
to Compel and denying plaintiffs Motion to Strike. Consistent with its 
Order, the Court explicitly required plaintiff Aurora credit to respond to 
defendants' second set of interrogatories and second set of requests for 
production of documents within thirty (30) days, with discovery to be 
completed in sixty (60) days. Plaintiff failed to do so. To this day, Aurora 
Credit has failed, in direct contravention of the Court's Order, to provide 
defendants with basic documents and information crucial to its defense of 
this case: the handwritten notes of President Charles F. Zak, Aurora's First 
Document Production, notes of Charles Zak regarding conversations with 
James Hogle, Tony Versteeg and Lonnie Anderson, relevant documents 
taken from Liberty West Development by a former employee, and 
identification of and basis for the claims alleged. 
R. at 3261 (emphasis added). 
In light of Aurora's refusal to produce the notes and other information requested 
by Defendants, and as ordered by the court, the court correctly concluded that Aurora 
violated the Order, and the judgment should be affirmed. 
IH. THE TRIAL COURT'S DISCOVERY SANCTIONS WERE 
COMMENSURATE ^TTH AURORA'S CONDUCT AND WITHIN THE 
COURT'S DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY 
Finally, Aurora claims the trial court abused its discretion by imposing the 
discovery sanctions of precluding Aurora from relying upon certain evidence at trial and 
strildng its Second Amended Complaint. See Appellant's Br. at 30-31. However, the 
sanctions in this case were proportionate to Aurora's conduct, and the trial court did not 
act outside of its discretion. 
Under Utah law, the imposition of discovery sanctions requires a threshold 
showing of "willfulness, bad faith, fault or persistent dilatory tactics frustrating the 
judicial process." Morton, 938 P.2d at 274 (emphasis added). "To support a finding of 
willfuhiess, there need only be 'any intentional failure as distmguished from involuntary 
noncompliance. No wrongful intent need be shown.'" Tuck v. Godfrey, 1999UTApp 
127, \ 15, 981 P.2d 407 (quoting Ogusthorpe, 892 P.2d at 8). Once the threshold 
determination is made, however, u[t]he choice of an appropriate discovery sanction is 
primarily the responsibility of the trial judge." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted); see also Hales, 200 UT App 75, % 18 ("Once this initial determination is made. 
the full range of options for sanctions under Rule 37 is available, and the trial court has 
broad discretion to select which sanction to apply in the circumstances."). This is 
because the trial court, which has lived first hand with the case and counsel—in this case 
for many years—is in the best position to determine what sanctions will be effective: 
Because the trial judge deals directly with the parties and the discovery 
process, he or she has great latitude in detennining the most efficient and 
fair manner to conduct the court's business. As a result, trial courts have 
broad discretion in determining whether a violation of a scheduling order 
warrants sanction. 
A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Constr., 1999 UT App 87. % 36, 977 
P.2d 518 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
Contrary to Aurora's assertion, there is substantial record evidence to support the 
trial court's threshold finding that Aurora willfully violated the Order and otherwise 
engaged in dilatory behavior. Indeed, prior to Defendants' motion to compel, Aurora 
informed Defendants counsel that it did not intend to respond and would not respond to 
the Second Set of Requests, forcing Defendants to move to compel. See R. at 1478. 
Even after the motion to compel was granted, Aurora continued its willful refusal to 
provide the requested information, and it still failed to provide any information during the 
nearly year-long period between Defendants' motion for sanctions on May 22, 2003, and 
the court's disposition of the motion at the hearing on May 5, 2004. R. at 3348. As 
discussed above, Aurora did not provide any responsive information in its purported 
"response," despite the court's clear Order. 
Additionally, rather than simply responding to the Second Set of Requests, Aurora 
filed a motion to strike, see R. at 1539; a motion for a protective order to delay the 
deposition of Mr. Zak, see R. at 1798; a motion to appoint a special master, see R. at 
1790; and a motion to toll the discover)7 deadlines pending resolution of the discovery 
issues by the special master. See R. 1803. These motions, the first of which was filed 
after the filing of Defendant's motion to compel, and the latter three of which were filed 
after the issuance of the Order granting Defendants' motion to compel, are more than 
sufficient to support the conclusion that Aurora acted willfully and engaged in tactics 
intended to delay the proceedings and waste judicial resources. 
Moreover, there was no abuse of discretion with respect to the trial court's 
sanctions. As Utah courts have repeatedly noted, trial courts have broad discretion in 
imposing discovery sanctions under Rule 37 because they are the ones who "deal first 
hand with the parties and the discover)7 process." Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d at 6 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). For that reason. 
[a] trial court's abuse of discretion in selecting which sanction to impose 
may be shown "only if there is either an erroneous conclusion of law or no 
evidentiary basis for the trial court's ruling." 
Tuck, 1999 UT App 127, ^  15 (quoting Morton, 938 P.2d at 274) (emphasis added). 
Aurora claims that the trial court's initial determination that the sendee of the 
Second Set of Requests was the "erroneous conclusion of law" that led it to improperly 
grant the motion to compel and later enter sanctions against it. As discussed above, 
however, this argument is completely lacking in merit, as is the argument that the court 
erred in determining that Aurora violated the Order. 
Aurora's intransigence, and its refusal to take "no" for an answer, also 
demonstrate the propriety of the sanctions chosen by the trial court. Appellate courts 
routinely uphold discovery sanctions like those in this case for similar or far less 
egregious behavior. See, e.g., Morton, 938 P.2d at 276 (relied upon by Aurora) 
(reinstating trial court's dismissal of action where the plaintiff willfully failed to compfy 
with discovery order); Ogusthorpe, 892 P.2d at 7 (relied upon by Aurora) (upholding 
dismissal of action where defendant willfully and repeatedly failed to respond to 
discover)' and other motions); see also W. W. & W.B. Gardner, Inc. v. Park West Village, 
568 P.2d at 736-37 (Utah 1997) (affirming default judgment against party who failed to 
answer interrogatories, even though the party attempted to serve the responses just prior 
to sanctions hearing); Joseph v. Salt Lake City Civil Sen\ Comm n, 2002 UT App 254, J^ 
14, 53 P.3d 11 (affirming dismissal for plaintiffs failure to comply with repeated 
discoveiy requests, even though no discovery order had been entered); Schoney v. 
Memorial Estates, Inc., 790 P.2d 584, 584-85 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (upholding default 
judgment despite party's tender of responses at hearing on sanctions); Arnica Mut. Ins. 
Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 962 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (affirming default against party 
who failed to meet discovery deadlines and only partly responded to motion to compel). 
Like the courts in all of these cases, this Court should conclude that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion. 
Because the record supports the trial court's findings of Aurora's willfulness and 
dilatory behavior, and because the sanctions of dismissal and evidence preclusion were 
proportionate to Aurora's abuse of the process, the trial court's imposition of sanctions 
and the resulting judgment should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the reasons set forth above, Defendants respectfully ask the Court to 
affirm the trial court's entry of the final judgment in this matter. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 27th day of June, 2005. 
MAGLEBY & GREENWOOD, P.C. 
James E. Magleby 
Christine T. Greenwood 
A ttomeys for Defendants-Appellees Liberty 
West Development, Inc., XMInternational, and 
Dennis W. Gay 
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Exhibit A 
Rule 5- Service and filing of pleadings and other papers, 
(a) Service: When required. 
(a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in these rules or as otherwise directed by the court, 
every judgment, every order required by its terms to be served, every pleading 
subsequent to the original complaint, every paper relating to discovery, every written 
motion other than one heard ex parte, and every written notice, appearance, demand, 
offer of judgment, and similar paper shall be served upon each of the parties. 
(a)(2) No service need be made on parties in default except that: 
(a)(2)(A) a party in default shall be served as ordered by the court; 
(a)(2)(B) a party in default for any reason other than for failure to appear shall be served 
with all pleadings and papers; 
(a)(2)(C) a party in default for any reason shall be served with notice of any hearing 
necessary to determine the amount of damages to be entered against the defaulting party; 
(a)(2)(D) a party in default for any reason shall be served with notice of entry of 
judgment under Rule 58A(d); and 
(a)(2)(E) pleadings asserting new or additional claims for relief against a party in default 
for any reason shall be served in the manner provided for service of summons in Rule 4. 
(a)(3) In an action begun by seizure of property, whether through arrest, attachment, 
garnishment or similar process, in which no person need be or is named as defendant, any 
service required to be made prior to the filing of an answer, claim or appearance shall be 
made upon the person having custody or possession of the property at the time of its 
seizure. 
(b) Service: How made and by whom. 
(b)(1) Whenever under these rules service is required or permitted to be made upon a 
party represented by an attorney, the service shall be made upon the attorney unless 
service upon the party is ordered by the court. Service upon the attorney or upon a party 
shall be made by delivering a copy or by mailing a copy to the last known address or, if 
no address is known, by leaving it with the clerk of the court. 
(b)(1)(A) Delivery of a copy within this rule means: Handing it to the attorney or to the 
party; or leaving it at the person's office with a clerk or person in charge thereof; or, if 
there is no one in charge, leaving it in a conspicuous place therein; or, if the office is 
closed or the person to be served has no office, leaving it at the person's dwelling house 
or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing 
therein; or, if consented to in writing by the person to be served, delivering a copy by 
electronic or other means. 
(b)(1)(B) Service by mail is complete upon mailing. If the paper served is notice of a 
hearing and if the hearing is scheduled 5 days or less from the date of service, service 
shall be by delivery or other method of actual notice. Service by electronic means is 
complete on transmission if transmission is completed during normal business hours at 
the place receiving the service; otherwise, service is complete on the next business day. 
(b)(2) Unless otherwise directed by the court: 
(b)(2)(A) an order signed by the court and required by its terms to be served or a 
judgment signed by the court shall be served by the party preparing it; 
(b)(2)(B) every other pleading or paper required by this rule to be served shall be served 
by the party preparing it; and 
(b)(2)(C) an order or judgment prepared by the court shall be served by the court. 
(c) Service: Numerous defendants. In any action in which there is an unusually large 
number of defendants, the court, upon motion or of its own initiative, may order that 
service of the pleadings of the defendants and replies thereto need not be made as 
between the defendants and that any cross-claim, counterclaim, or matter constituting an 
avoidance or affirmative defense contained therein shall be deemed to be denied or 
avoided by all other parties and that the filing of any such pleading and service thereof 
upon the plaintiff constitutes due notice of it to the parties. A copy of every such order 
shall be served upon the parties in such manner and form as the court directs. 
(d) Filing. All papers after the complaint required to be served upon a party shall be filed 
with the court either before or within a reasonable time after service. The papers shall be 
accompanied by a certificate of service showing the date and manner of service 
completed by the person effecting service. Rule 26(i) governs the filing of papers related 
to discovery. 
(e) Filing with the court defined. The filing of pleadings and other papers with the court 
as required by these rules shall be made by filing them with the clerk of the court, except 
that the judge may accept the papers, note thereon the filing date and forthwith transmit 
them to the office of the clerk. 
Exhibit B 
Rule 37. Failure to make or cooperate in discovery; sanctions. 
(a) Motion for order compelling discovery. A party, upon reasonable notice to other 
parties and all persons affected thereby, may apply for an order compelling discovery as 
follows: 
(1) Appropriate court. An application for an order to a party may be made to the court in 
which the action is pending, or, on matters relating to a deposition, to the court in the 
district where the deposition is being taken. An application for an order to a deponent 
who is not a party shall be made to the court in the district where the deposition is being 
taken. 
(2) Motion. 
(A) If a party fails to make a disclosure required by Rule 26(a), any other party may 
move to compel disclosure and for appropriate sanctions. The motion must include a 
certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the 
party not making the disclosure in an effort to secure the disclosure without court action. 
(B) If a deponent fails to answer a question propounded or submitted under Rule 30 or 
31, or a corporation or other entity fails to make a designation under Rule 30(b)(6) or 
31(a), or a party fails to answer an interrogatory submitted under Rule 33, or if a party, in 
response to a request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, fails to respond that 
inspection will be permitted as requested or fails to permit inspection as requested, the 
discovering party may move for an order compelling an answer, or a designation, or an 
order compelling inspection in accordance with the request. The motion must include a 
certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the 
person or party failing to make the discovery in an effort to secure the information or 
material without court action. When taking a deposition on oral examination, the 
proponent of the question may complete or adjourn the examination before applying for 
an order. 
(3) Evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer, or response. For purposes of this 
subdivision an evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer, or response is to be treated as a 
failure to disclose, answer, or respond. 
(4) Expenses and sanctions. 
(A) If the motion is granted, or if the disclosure or requested discovery is provided after 
the motion was filed, the court shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the party or 
deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion or the party or attorney advising such 
conduct or both of them to pay to the moving party the reasonable expenses incurred in 
obtaining the order, including attorney fees, unless the court finds that the motion was 
filed without the movant's first making a good faith effort to obtain the disclosure or 
discovery without court action, or that the opposing party's nondisclosure, response, or 
objection was substantially justified, or that other circumstances make an award of 
expenses unjust. 
(B) If the motion is denied, the court may enter any protective order authorized under 
Rule 26(c) and shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the moving party or the 
attorney or both of them to pay to the party or deponent who opposed the motion the 
reasonable expenses incurred in opposing the motion, including attorney fees, unless the 
court finds that the making of the motion was substantially justified or that other 
circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
(C) If the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the court may enter any protective 
order authorized under Rule 26(c) and may, after opportunity for hearing, apportion the 
reasonable expenses incurred in relation to the motion among the parties and persons in a 
just manner. 
(b) Failure to comply with order. 
(1) Sanctions by court in district where deposition is taken. If a deponent fails to be 
sworn or to answer a question after being directed to do so by the court in the district in 
which the deposition is being taken, the failure may be considered a contempt of that 
court. 
(2) Sanctions by court in which action is pending. If a party or an officer, director, or 
managing agent of a party or a person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify 
on behalf of a party fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, including an 
order made under Subdivision (a) of this rule or Rule 35, or if a party fails to obey an 
order entered under Rule 16(b), the court in which the action is pending may make such 
orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others the following: 
(A) an order that the matters regarding which the order was made or any other designated 
facts shall be taken to be established for the purposes of the action in accordance with the 
claim of the party obtaining the order; 
(B) an order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose designated 
claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing designated matters in evidence; 
(C) an order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, staying further proceedings until the 
order is obeyed, dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a 
judgment by default against the disobedient party; 
(D) in lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an order treating as a 
contempt of court the failure to obey any orders except an order to submit to a physical or 
mental examination; 
(E) where a party has failed to comply with an order under Rule 35(a), such orders as are 
listed in Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of this subdivision, unless the party failing to 
comply is unable to produce such person for examination. 
In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, the court shall require the 
party failing to obey the order or the attorney or both of them to pay the reasonable 
expenses, including attorney fees, caused by the failure, unless the court finds that the 
failure was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses 
unjust. 
(c) Expenses on failure to admit. If a party fails to admit the genuineness of any 
document or the truth of any matter as requested under Rule 36, and if the party 
requesting the admissions thereafter proves the genuineness of the document or the truth 
of the matter, the party requesting the admissions may apply to the court for an order 
requiring the other party to pay the reasonable expenses incurred in making that proof, 
including reasonable attorney fees. The court shall make the order unless it finds that (1) 
the request was held objectionable pursuant to Rule 36(a), or (2) the admission sought 
was of no substantial importance, or (3) the party failing to admit had reasonable ground 
to believe that he might prevail on the matter, or (4) there was other good reason for the 
failure to admit. 
(d) Failure of party to attend at own deposition or serve answers to interrogatories or 
respond to request for inspection. If a party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a 
party or a person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party 
fails (1) to appear before the officer who is to take the deposition, after being served with 
a proper notice, or (2) to serve answers or objections to interrogatories submitted under 
Rule 33, after proper service of the interrogatories, or (3) to serve a written response to a 
request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, after proper service of the request, the 
court in which the action is pending on motion may make such orders in regard to the 
failure as are just, and among others it may take any action authorized under Paragraphs 
(A), (B), and (C) of Subdivision (b)(2) of this rule. In lieu of any order or in addition 
thereto, the court shall require the party failing to act or the party's attorney or both to pay 
the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless the court 
finds that the failure was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an 
award of expenses unjust. 
The failure to act described in this subdivision may not be excused on the ground that the 
discovery sought is objectionable unless the party failing to act has applied for a 
protective order as provided by Rule 26(c). 
(e) Failure to participate in the framing of a discovery plan. If a party or attorney fails to 
participate in good faith in the framing of a discovery plan by agreement as is required by 
Rule 26(f), the court may, after opportunity for hearing, require such party or attorney to 
pay to any other party the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused by the 
failure. 
(f) Failure to disclose. If a party fails to disclose a witness, document or other material as 
required by Rule 26(a) or Rule 26(e)(1), or to amend a prior response to discovery as 
required by Rule 26(e)(2), that party shall not be permitted to use the witness, document 
or other material at any hearing unless the failure to disclose is harmless or the party 
shows good cause for the failure to disclose. In addition to or in lieu of this sanction, the 
court may order any other sanction, including payment of reasonable costs and attorney 
fees, any order permitted under subpart (b)(2)(A), (B) or (C) and informing the jury of 
the failure to disclose. 
Exhibit C 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT-SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
AURORA CREDIT SERVICES : MEMORAM3tftTOTCISTO^ 
Plaintiff, : Case No. 940904935 
: Judge L. A. DEVER 
v. : 
LIBERTY WEST DEVELOPMENT, et al. : Date: August 1,2002 
Defendant. : 
This matter is before the Court on defendants Dennis M. Gay's and XM International's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, and Plaintiffs Motion to Compel pursuant to Rule 4-501. After hearing oral argument 
on May 2, 2002, the Court took these matters under advisement. Having considered the argument of the 
parties, and the Motions and the Memoranda submitted thereby, the Court enters the following decision: 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
This action regards interest in stock in the now defunct Liberty West Development, and the events 
surrounding the loss of Liberty West's primary asset, an office complex located in Ogden, Utah. In 
defendants' first attempt to obtain summary judgment in this case, addressed on appeal in Aurora Credit 
Services, Inc., v, Liberty West Development, Inc., etal, 970 P.2d 1273 (Utah 1998), the Supreme Court made clear 
that because the undisputed facts reveal Plaintiff acquired no interest in Liberty West Development until after 
the arguably actionable events occurred, Plaintiff could recover both directly and derivatively only if it could 
demonstrate that the fraudulent concealment exception to the contemporaneous ownership rule applies. 
Specifically the Court stated: "we will allow a noncontemporaneous shareholder to bring a derivative suit 
if he or she can show (i) that the corporation fraudulently concealed wrongdoing from shareholders and (ii) 
that a reasonable shareholder would not have discovered the wrongdoing earlier." Id at 1279 (emphasis added). 
In reversing this Court's grant of summary judgment, the Supreme Court held that the consideration under 
AURORA V. LIBERTY WEST PAGE 2 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
the second prong, under the circumstances of this case, required the trier of fact to consider whether it would 
have been reasonable for the plaintiff to take certain actions which would have led to the discovery of the 
cause of action earlier than it was discovered. The Court did not address the first prong as it was assumed 
satisfied for purposes of that motion. 
Defendants now seek summary judgment based upon the first prong analysis, under the theory that 
because Dennis M. Gay, James Hogle, Jr., and the other two individuals that formed Liberty West were the 
only stockholders at all relevant times to plaintiffs causes of action, and because these shareholders knew of 
the alleged wrongdoing at the time it occurred, plaintiff cannot meet the requirements of the first prong of 
the exception. Defendants forward a second argument, which is that because plaintiffs shares were ultimately 
obtained from Hogle, plaintiff may only assert the rights which Hogle could have asserted while he was a 
shareholder, and because he knew of the alleged wrongdoing and consented to it, neither he, nor plaintiff, his 
successor in interest, may now be heard to object. Plaintiff argues that because the parties disagree on who 
was the "shareholder" at the time of the wrongdoing, there is an issue of fact which precludes summary 
judgment. 
While circumstances may arise requiring specific analysis regarding whether the holder of a security 
interest in stock (such as the FDIC and Aurora, prior to the April 1993 foreclosure) would be entitled to 
maintain a shareholder's derivative action under the fraudulent concealment exception to the 
contemporaneous ownership doctrine, such analysis is unnecessary in this case. Facts stated in the Supreme 
Court's decision are controlling: 
On January 8, 1992, the FDIC executed a formal assignment to Aurora of its interest in the 
Hogle judgment, including its security interest in Hogle's LWD stock. Aurora notified LWD 
and Gay of its acquisition of the security interest on January 20, 1992. Aurora foreclose J on 
the security in the Hogle stock in April of 1993. 
From the time the FDIC acquired the interest in the Hogle judgment and through early July 
1993, after it had been assigned to Aurora, LWD represented first to the FDIC and then to 
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Aurora that it owned and was trying to sell the Ogden property. . . . However, after May of 
1991 these and other statements were no longer true. 
Id. at 1276. Regardless of what interest the FDIC and Aurora, prior to foreclosure held, these facts 
demonstrate that at least a question for the finder of fact exists whether "affirmative steps to conceal 
wrongdoing" from plaintiff were undertaken from April 1993 until July 7,1993. Unlike the continuing harm 
exception, which will not lie when the harm is complete prior to a plaintiff's ownership of interest {see Id. at 
1278), the fraudulent concealment exception, as it has been framed by the Supreme Court, would appear to 
apply even when the concealment occurs after the harm is complete. Accordingly, plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment is DENIED. 
Plaintiffs Motion to Compel 
Based upon the plaintiffs failure to timely object to the adequacy of the defendants' supplemental 
answers, under this Court's June 28, 2000 Order, the answers to the plaintiffs first discovery requests were 
deemed complete. The Court interprets the initial discovery requests as asking for certain specific 
information, which was provided to the apparent satisfaction of the plaintiffs. Accordingly, to the extent that 
responses called for by the plaintiffs current discovery requests would contain information which is precisely 
duplicative of the information given in response to, or specifically requested by the first discover}* requests, 
such information need not be provided. Except as provided herein, plaintiffs Motion to Compel is hereby 
GRANTED. Defendants are hereby ordered to supplement their answers to the second set of interrogatories. 
Any supplemental responses to which plaintiff does not object within 14 days of the service will be deemed 
complete. 
This constitutes the final order of the Court on the matters referenced herein. N o further order need 
be prepared. 
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LIBERTY WEST DEVELOPMENT, INC., Civil No.: 940904935 
a Utah corporation, XM 
INTERNATIONAL, LLC a Utah limited Honorable Leon A. Dever 
liability company, and DENNIS W. GAY, 
an individual, 
Defendants. 
On Wednesday, March 26, 2003, at approximately 11:00 a.m., the Court heard argument 
on various matters presented by the parties. Plaintiff Aurora Credit Services, Inc. ("Aurora") 
was represented by Eric P. Hartman, Esq. Defendants XM International, LLC and Dennis W. 
Gay were represented by James E. Magleby, Esq. The Court heard argument on Defendants' 
Motion to Compel and Plaintiffs Motion to Strike. The Court also heard argument as to whether 
r::'.?*?'$H5ieT-C0VIT 
i (ho Judicsa! District 
Deputy Clerk 
counsel for Defendants Dennis W. Gay and XM International, LLC, the law firm of Miller 
Magleby &Guymon, P.C. (and its predecessor counsel, Ballard Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll, 
LLP), effectively withdrew as counsel of record for Defendant Liberty West Development, Inc. 
("LWD"), or, in the alternative, whether counsel may be allowed to withdraw, if the Notice of 
Withdrawal was not automatically effective. Finally, the Court heard argument on Plaintiffs 
Objection to Adequacy of Defendants' Supplemental Responses to Plaintiffs Second Set of 
Interrogatories and Request for Document of Documents and the Addendum to Plaintiffs 
Objection to Adequacy of Defendants' Supplementary Discovery Responses, the latter of which 
was submitted on March 25, 2003. 
Based upon the papers submitted by the parties, the pleadings and papers on file with the 
Court, the arguments presented by counsel, and for good cause shown, the Court hereby 
ORDERS as follows: 
1. Defendants' Motion to Compel is GRANTED, and Plaintiffs Motion to Strike is 
DENIED. Plaintiff Aurora Credit Services, Inc. will respond to Defendants' 
Second Set of Interrogatories to Plaintiff, and Defendants' Second Set of Requests 
for Production of Documents to Plaintiff, within thirty (30) days from Masn 26? 
2003. Each party is to bear its own attorney fees and costs. 
2. If discovery disputes remain between the parties thirty-five (35) days after"WEB Hi 
4&, 2003, then on the thirty-fifth day the Court shall appoint a Special Master to 
preside over all pre-trial discovery disputes. In the event a Special Master is 
appointed, the Plaintiff and the Defendants will share the cost for the Special 
3. Discovery shall be completed sixty (60) days from March 26, 2003. ufet^  
DATED this ^  day of April 2003. 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
ric P. Hartman, Esq. ^-So E i  . t , . 
Attorney for Plaintiff Aurora Credit Services, Inc. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am an employee of the law firm of Miller Magleby & Guymon, 
P.C., 170 South Main Street, Suite 350, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101, and that pursuant to Rule 
5(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was 
delivered to the following on March 26, 2003, and again on April 7, 2003, by: 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile No. 
[X] Depositing the same in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Federal Express 
[ ] Certified Mail, Receipt No. , return receipt requested 
Eric P. Hartman 
2558 South Wilshire Circle 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Facsimile: (801) 467-6691 
Attorney for Aurora Credit Services, Inc. 
Exhibit E 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 





LIBERTY WEST DEVELOPMENT, INC., 
a Utah corporation, XM 
INTERNATIONAL, L.L.C., a Utah limited 




CASE NO. 940904935 
JUDGE LA. DEVER 
The Court has before it a request for decision in connection with several pending 
motions, including: 1) Defendants' Motion For Rule 37 Sanctions; 2) Defendants' 
Motion To Dismiss; and 3) Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment. Oral 
arguments were heard on May 5, 2004 after which the Court took the matter under 
advisement. 
On April 8, 2003 this Court entered an Order granting defendants' Motion To 
Compel and denying plaintiffs Motion To Strike. Consistent with its Order, the Court 
explicitly required plaintiff Aurora Credit to respond to defendants' second set of 
Aurora Credit v. Liberty West Page 2 
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interrogatories and second set of requests for production of documents within thirty (30) 
days, with discovery to be completed within sixty (60) days. Plaintiff failed to do so.1 To 
this day, Aurora Credit has failed, in direct contravention of the Court's Order, to provide 
defendants with basic documents and information crucial to its defense of this case: 
the handwritten notes of President Charles F Zak, Aurora's First Document Production, 
notes of Charles Zak regarding conversations with James Hogle, Tony Veersteeg and 
Lonnie Anderson, relevant documents taken from Liberty West Development by a 
former employee, and identification of and basis for the claims alleged. 
As a result of Aurora Credit blatant and willful disregard of the Court's Order, this 
Court concludes, in reliance upon the discretionary powers granted to it pursuant to 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 37, that severe sanctions are warranted. See, Tuck v 
Godfrey 981 P.1d 407, 412 (Utah App 1999)(citing, Morton v Continental Bank 938 
P.2d 271, 275 (Utah 1997)) (if sanctions warranted, trial judge to determine appropriate 
sanction). 
For these reasons the Court hereby enters the following sanctions against Aurora 
Credit: 
1. A Preclusion Order is entered, excluding Aurora from relying upon any 
evidence which it refused to provide through discovery. Specifically, the 
]While the Court recognizes that on May 7, 2003 Aurora served defendants with 
"written responses", such responses were wholly inadequate. Additionally, Aurora 
refused to produce the requested documentation imperative to defendants' defense. 
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alleged conversations between Charles Zak and Dennis Gay as reflected 
in the handwritten notes of Charles Zak. 
2. Aurora's Second Amended Complaint is stricken due to Aurora's refusal to 
identify its claims and provide any evidence in support thereof. 
Due to plaintiffs egregious disregard for the Court's prior ruling, the Court enters the 
above noted dispositive sanctions thereby making it unnecessary to address the 
remaining motions. 
Defendants' counsel to prepare an Order consistent with this Minute Entry for 
submission to the Court. 
Dated this / day of May, 2004. 
BY THE COURT: 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing MINUTE 
ENTRY, to the following, this_£_ Day of_ 
_' '»>_ rP j? 
James Magleby 
Miller, Magleby & Guymon 
170 South Main Street, Suite 350 
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Civil No.: 940904935 
Honorable Leon A. Dever 
On Monday, May 5, 2004. the Court hear argument on the following motions: 
Defendants' Motion for Rule 37 Sanctions; (2) Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment; and 
(3) Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Plamtiff Aurora Credit Services, Inc. ("Aurora") was 
represented by Eric P. Hartman, Esq. Defendants Liberty West Development, Inc., XM 
International LLC and Dennis W. Gay (collectively, "Defendants") were represented by James 
E. Magleby, Esq, of MILLER MAGLEBY & GUYMON, P.C. 
The Court ruled by way of a Minute Entry signed on May 9, 2004 (the "Minute Entry"). 
Based upon the papers submitted by the parties, the pleadings and papers on file with the Court, 
the arguments presented by counsel, the reasons set forth in the Minute Entry, and for good cause 
shown, the Court hereby ORDERS as follows: 
1. Defendants' Motion for Rule 37 Sanctions is GRANTED, as follows: 
a. The Court hereby enters a preclusion order, excluding Plaintiff from using or 
relying upon any testimony relating to the alleged conversations between 
Plaintiffs President, Charles Zak, and Defendant Dennis W. Gay. 
b. The Second Amended Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, due to 
Aurora's failure to identify its claims and evidence in support thereof. 
•8* Dofondanto' Motion for Suniampy Judgment io GRANTED, ao followsi 
-a:—Booauoo I4a*ft##H#™p^ ^^ ^ upwsaiiy teutimuny 
relating to the alleged oonveroationG bofovoon "Plaintiff o Prooidont, Charioo 
Bole, and Dc?fondant-DQiiM'fr^ ^ Gay- the Court findoi>thflt"MaJ«tiff||QQiinot moot 
the frauduk^^^ 0lto#ding"rQqukomoiit&. 
&.m,^ A#@®fdingl^  W B W t t e o£iaw"«w[ <thw> 
Qiiuiid iftumiiidad ^ JPaivgBBeEMWT^PREJUDIOC. 
TL. The remaining iss&o&ktmRoiS^ motionc are rendered moot by the 
Court's Minute Entry and this Order, and so the Court does not address those 
issues. 
2 
DATED this _\V day of \ y  f f y JSs/2 >004. 
! THIRD JUDICIAL 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Honor; 
Eric P. Hartman, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiff Aurora Credit Services, Inc. 
^ 
CLERKS CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am employed by the law firm of MILLER MAGLEBY & GUYMON, 
P.C., 170 South Main Street, Suite 350, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101, and that pursuant to Rule 
5(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was 
delivered to the following on the day of 2004 by: 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile No. 
[X] Depositing the same in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Federal Express 
[ ] Certified Mail, Receipt No. , return receipt requested 
James E. Magleby Eric P. Hartman 
MILLER MAGLEBY & GUYMON, P.C. 2 5 5 8 S o u t h Wilshire Circle 
170 South Main Street, Suite 350 S a l t L a k e Cl^ U t a h 8 4 1 0 9 
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Attorney for Defendants 
4 
Exhibit G 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 





LIBERTY WEST DEVELOPMENT, INC., 
a Utah corporation, XM 
INTERNATIONAL, L.L.C., a Utah limited 
liability company, and DENNIS W. GAY, 
an individual, , 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
CASE NO. 940904935 
JUDGE L.A. DEVER 
On July 13, 2004 this Court issued an order imposing sanctions against plaintiff 
Aurora Credit Services based upon their "blatant and willful disregard" of the Court's 
previous Orders. Aurora has now filed a motion requesting that the Court's Order 
imposing sanctions be altered or amended. 
Upon consideration of Aurora's pleadings, the Court concludes that plaintiffs 
claims were previously rejected by this Court, and that the current motion merely 
represents Aurora's attempt to re-address old issues and arguments. Accordingly, 
Aurora's Motion To Amend is hereby denied. 
Aurora Credit v. Liberty West Page 2 
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Order 
This is the Court's final Order. 
Dated this * ^ day of November, 2004. 
BY THE COURU 
DISTRICT 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER, to the 
following, thisjO Day of U Jw. , 2004: 
Eric P Hartman 
2558 South Wilshire Circle 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
James E Magleby 
Miller Magleby & Guymon 
170 South Main Street, Suite 350 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
